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BANKRUPTCY LAW-DETERMINING PROPERTY INTERESTS IN
FUNDS RECOVERED PURSUANT TO THE SETTLEMENT OF A SECTION

547

PREFERENCE ACTION
INTRODUCTION

A debtor in financial distress often makes transfers of its property

that have the effect of preferring some creditors over others. If the
debtor subsequently enters bankruptcy, section 547(b) of the Bank
ruptcy Code! authorizes the trustee2 of the bankruptcy estate3 to avoid
certain of these prepetition transfers, thereby recovering property for
the benefit of the estate. 4 The property recovered for the benefit of the
estate becomes available either for general distribution to the debtor's
creditors in a liquidation proceeding or for use by the estate in a
reorganization. S
However, the trustee's section 547(b) preference avoidance pow
ers only apply to transfers "of an interest of the debtor in property."6
Often, a debtor will be in possession of property in which others also
have an interest. Such situations include escrow and trust arrange
ments. The language of section 547(b) seems to indicate that property
held in this fashion would not be subject to a preference action. 7 In
this regard, courts have ruled that property held in trust by the debtor
and money held in escrow by the debtor do not become part of the
bankruptcy estate. 8
1. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). The Bankruptcy Code is the name commonly used
when referring to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988».
2. See infra note 12 for an explanation of the term "bankruptcy trustee."
3. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text for an explanation of the term
"bankruptcy estate."
4. These prior transfers are termed "preferences" by § 547. See infra notes 14-20
and accompanying text for an explanation of "preferences."
5. See infra note 29 for an explanation of liquidation and reorganization proceedings.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
7. See id.
8. See. e.g., Turley v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc. (In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc.), 817
F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that money held in constructive trust by the debtor
did not become part of the bankruptcy estate); Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d
257, 261 (1st Cir. 1963) (concluding that money held in escrow by the debtor did not
become property of the bankruptcy estate); Stickney v. General Elec. Co. (In re Spear
Eng'rs, Inc.), 44 F.2d 362, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1930) (holding that money held in escrow by a
debtor may constitute a trust fund for those entitled to it).
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However, a complication arises when the debtor has misappropri
ated trust or escrow funds prior to bankruptcy, and the trustee in
bankruptcy later comes into possession of the misappropriated funds.
In this instance, the trustee in bankruptcy may be inclined to regard
such funds as recovered for the benefit of the estate under section
547(b), while the beneficiary or depositor of the funds may claim own
ership of them. In Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital
Mortgage Loan Corp. ),9 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
addressed this problem for the first time. The Tenth Circuit held in
favor of the trustee, thus allowing all creditors of the estate to share in
the funds. 10
This Note considers the dilemma that arises when the bankruptcy
trustee comes into possession of misappropriated escrow funds pursu
ant to the settlement of a section 547 preference action. It focuses on
the interpretation of section 547 regarding the type of property interest
subject to the trustee's section 547 avoidance powers. Section I dis
cusses the mechanics of a section 547 preference action and explores
the primary purpose of section 547. Section II sets out the facts of
First Capital and the reasoning of the bankruptcy court, district court
and the court of appeals. Section III then analyzes the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals' for the Tenth Circuit in First Capital,
which permitted the trustee to recover misappropriated escrow funds
for the benefit of the estate, and suggests that the decision is in conflict
with the basic tenets of both property and bankruptcy law as applied
to misappropriated trust funds.
I.

BACKGROUND

When a bankruptcy petition is filed, a bankruptcy estate is imme
diately created under section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. l1 The
bankruptcy estate includes all property in which the debtor has a legal
or equitable interest and all property recovered by the bankruptcy
trustee l2 for the benefit of the estate. 13 In certain situations, the Bank
ruptcy Code, under section 547(b), allows the trustee in bankruptcy to
9. 917 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
10. [d. at 429.
II. II U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
12.
"bankruptcy trustee" is a person appointed by the bankruptcy court to take
charge of the estate. Under II U.S.C. § 323 (1988), "[t]he trustee ... is the representative
of the estate" and "has capacity to sue and be sued." [d.
13. II U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988). Section 541(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever
located and by whomever held:

The
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recover a transfer made by the debtor prior to the commencement of
the bankruptcy case. 14 Ifthe conditions of section 547(b) are met, the
recovered preference becomes part of the bankruptcy estate under sec
tion 550 15 and is available for distribution to creditors in a liquidation
proceeding or for use by the estate in reorganization. 16
The legislative history defines a section 547 preference as "a
transfer that enables a creditor to receive payment of a greater per
centage of his claim against the debtor than he would have received if
the transfer had not been made and he had participated in the distribu
(1) [A]lliegal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as ofthe com
mencement of the case.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section ... 550
... of this title.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commence
ment of the case.

Id.
14. Section 547(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in proPerty
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider;
and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
For an in-depth discussion of the mechanics of § 547, see Beverly J. Hall, Note, Prefer
ences and Setoffs: Sections 547 and 553, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 49, 50-75 (1985). See also
Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the
Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1986) (history of preference law); Vern Country
man, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1985)
(development of preference law).
15. Section 550(a) provides as follows: H[T]o the extent that a transfer is avoided
under section ... 547 ... of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate,
the property transferred ...." 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
See supra note 13 for the text of § 541(a), which includes within the estate property
recovered under § 550.
16. See infra note 29 for an explanation of liquidation and reorganization
proceedings.
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tion of the assets of the bankrupt estate." 17 The congressional purpose
in allowing the recovery of preferences for the benefit of the bank
ruptcy estate is twofold. First, by allowing the bankruptcy trustee to
avoid prebankruptcy transfers, creditors are discouraged from "racing
to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into bank
ruptcy."18 Often, this protection will enable the debtor to work its
way out of a difficult financial situation by cooperating with credi
tors.19 Second, and of greater importance, "the preference provisions
facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution
among creditors of the debtor."2o
However, the power of the trustee to recover property for the
benefit of the estate under section 547 is subject to the requirement
that the debtor have an interest in such property.21 Additionally, in its
discussion of property of the estate in the Senate Report22 on the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,23 Congress clearly manifests an in
tent to limit section 541 so that only property in which the debtor has
an interest may become property of the estate. 24 Consequently, sec
tions 541 and 547, as well as the Senate Report, indicate that the bank
ruptcy trustee does not have the power to include any property in the
estate which does not belong to the debtor.
17. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. See Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence 0/ Bank
ruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 735-39, 780-87 (1991) for a comparison of two suggested
rationales underlying bankruptcy law and their explication of the equality of distribution
principle.
21. 11 U.S.c. § 547(b) (1988).
22. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5868.
23. See supra note 1.
24. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 22, at 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5868.
The Senate Report states as follows:
Though [§ 541] will include choses in action and claims by the debtor against
others, it is not intended to expand the debtor's rights against others more than
they exist at the commencement of the case. . ..
Situations occasionally arise where property ostensibly belonging to the
debtor will actually not be property of the debtor, but will be held in trust for
another. For example, if the debtor has incurred medical bills that were covered
by insurance, and the insurance company had sent the payment of the bills to the
debtor before the debtor had paid the bill for which the payment was reimburse
ment, the payment would actually be held in a constructive trust for the person to
whom the bill was owed.
Id.
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RESEARCH-PLANNING, INC V. SEGAL (IN RE FIRST CAPITAL
MORTGAGE LOAN CORP. )25

Facts

The plaintiff, Research-Planning, Inc. ("Research-Planning")
contracted to loan $260,000 to a third party who intended to invest the
funds in real property. Research-Planning deposited the funds in es
crow with First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp. ("First Capital"),
which placed the escrow funds in its general account. During the fol
lowing week, First Security Bank of Utah ("First Security") drew two
checks on First Capital's general account in the amounts of $66,000
and $2,489.6626 in satisfaction of debts owed to it by First Capital. 27
The escrow agreement with Research-Planning did not permit First
Capital to release the funds to First Security. Consequently, the pay
ment of these funds to First Security constituted a breach of the es
crow agreement. First Security was not aware of the misappropriation
of the funds it received. 28
After the misappropriation of the escrow funds, First Capital be
came the object of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding under Chap
ter 729 of the Bankruptcy Code. 30 The trustee in bankruptcy brought
two actions against First Security to recover, as avoidable preferences
under section 547,31 the funds paid to it by First Capital. First Secur
ity settled these actions by voluntarily paying the disputed funds to the
trustee.32 Research-Planning then brought suit against the trustee,
claiming that the funds recovered from First Security were subject to a
25. 917 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
26. Id. at 425. The remainder of the escrow funds were disbursed by the debtor,
First Capital, and were not at issue in this case. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
assumed that Research·Planning never recovered these funds. Id. at 426 n.2.
27. First Capital's bank had refused to honor these checks prior to the deposit of the
escrow funds due to insufficient funds in First Capital's general account. Id. at 426. This
fact indicates that the funds paid to First Security were the same escrow funds that Re·
search·Planning deposited with First Capital.
28. /d.
29. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701·766 (1988). Section 726 provides for the pro rata distribution
of the debtor's assets among creditors where a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding has been
instituted. Id. A Chapter 7 proceeding is designed to liquidate the debtor's assets, payoff
the debtor's creditors and discharge the debtor from his other debts. BLACK'S LAW DIC·
. TIONARY 148 (6th ed. 1990). A Chapter 7 proceeding differs in this respect from rehabilita·
tive proceedings (e.g., Chapter 11 and Chapter 13), which attempt to reorganize the
debtor's affairs and allow it to repay creditors pursuant to a plan that avoids liquidation.
Id.
30. First Capital, 917 F.2d at 425.
31. Id. at 426. See supra note 14 for the elements of a § 547 preference action.
32. Id.
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trust in Research-Planning's favor and, therefore, were not available
for distribution to First Capital's general creditors. 33
B.

United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah 34

Research-Planning argued that the settlement funds were trust
property traceable to the escrow deposit and, thus, these funds were
not subject to the trustee's section 547 powers. 3S Research-Planning
further contended that if the other creditors were allowed to share in
these funds, they would be unjustly enriched since the trustee had no
power under the Bankruptcy Code to recover the funds for the benefit
of the estate. 36 The bankruptcy court agreed that if an express trust 3?
existed or if a constructive trust 38 should be imposed, Research-Plan
ning would be entitled to the funds. However, the court found the
facts inappropriate for the imposition of either type of trust.39
The court concluded that an express trust did not exist because
the funds were not traceable beyond the transfer to First Security.40
Additionally, the court declined to impose a constructive trust on the
funds because this would defeat the fundamental bankruptcy policy of
creditor equality.41 The court reasoned that since the bankruptcy
trustee represents all creditors, it would be inequitable to allow his
avoidance powers to benefit only Research-Planning. 42 Consequently,
the court dismissed Research-Planning's complaint. 43 Research-Plan
ning appealed to the United States District Court for the District of
Utah.
33. Id.
34. Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 60
B.R. 915 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986).
35. Id. at 916.
36. Id. at 916-17.
37. An "express trust" is defined as "[a] trust directly created for specific purposes in
contrast to a constructive ... trust which arises by implication of law or the demands of
equity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1511 (6th ed. 1990).
38. A "constructive trust" is an equitable remedy which requires proof of three ele
ments: (1) a wrongful act; (2) specific property acquired by the wrongdoer which is trace
able to the wrongful behavior; and (3) an equitable reason why the party holding the
property should not be allowed to keep it. Merrill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing
House Co.), 41 B.R. 985 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984).
39. First Capital, 60 B.R. at 917-18.
40. The court relied on the Restatement of Restitution which provides that "where a
person wrongfully disposes of the property of another but the property cannot be traced
into any product, the other has merely a personal claim against the wrongdoer." RE
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 215(1) (1937). See infra note 70.
41. First Capital, 60 B.R. at 919-20.
42. Id. at 919.
43. Id. at 920.
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United States District Court for the District of Utah 44

The district court began its analysis by accepting, arguendo, that
First Capital held the escrow funds in trust for Research-Planning. 45
The court reasoned, however, that" when First Capital wrongfully
transferred the funds to First Security, both legal and equitable title
vested in First Security by virtue of its status as a bona fide pur
chaser.46 As a result, the court held that Research-Planning had no
claim to the funds in the hands of First Security: Instead, Research
Planning's claim was against First Capital, which made Research
Planning only an unsecured creditor of First Capita1. 47
Research-Planning argued that the trustee's recovery of the funds
put the parties in the position they occupied prior to the transfers. 48
Research-Planning thus asserted that the reacquisition of the funds by
the trustee, as agent for the debtor, revived the trust in favor of Re
search-Planning. 49 On the basis of this reasoning, Research-Planning
concluded that the bankruptcy trustee, as escrow agent, succeeded to
First CapitaJ's interest in the funds, and Research-Planning, as escrow
depositor, had an interest in the funds superior to that of the trustee. 50
The court refused to adopt Research-Planning's logic and held
that a trustee succeeds to the rights of the transferee in an avoided
transfer. 51 The court rejected Research-Planning's argument that a
44. Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 99
B.R. 462 (D. Utah 1987).
45. Id. at 465 n.4. Strictly speaking, an escrow agent is not a trustee because he does
not hold legal title to the escrow property. The depositor retains legal title until the escrow
conditions are either accomplished or abandoned. Id. See Tucker v. Dr. P. Phillips Co.,
139 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1943).
However, at least one court has ruled that escrow funds are held subject to a trust in
favor of the depositor. See Parker State Bank v. Pennington, 9 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1925).
46. First Capital, 99 B.R. at 465-66 (relying on REsTATEMENT OF REsrrruTION
§ 172 (1936)). A "bona fide purchaser" is defined as "[o]ne who has purchased property
for value without any notice of any defects in the title of the seller." BLACK'S LAW DIC
TIONARY 177 (6th ed. 1990).
47. First Capital, 99 B.R. at 464. The court did not explain this conclusion, but it
apparently rests on the assumption that the claim for breach of fiduciary duty, which Re
search-Planning had against First Capital for misappropriating the escrow funds, was an
unsecured claim.
48. Id. at 466.
49. Id. (relying on Turner v. Kirkwood, 49 F.2d 590, 596 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 635 (1931)); see also Angeles Real Estate Co. v. Kerxton (In re Construction
General, Inc.), 737 F.2d 416, 418 (4th Cir. 1984) (contending that the bankruptcy trustee
stands in the shoes of the debtor).
50. First Capital, 99 B.R. at 466. Research-Planning relied on Gulf Petroleum S.A.
v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257, 261 (Ist Cir. 1963) (holding that a bankruptcy trustee has a duty
to return escrow funds to the depositor upon failure of the escrow condition).
51. First Capital, 99 B.R. at 466 (relying on In re Vermont Fiberglass, Inc., 44 B.R.
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revival of the trust had occurred on two grounds. First, since the filing
of a bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy estate under section 541
of the Bankruptcy Code,52 the estate and the debtor are separate enti
ties. Under section 323 the trustee is a "representative of the estate,"
and not a representative of the debtor. 53 Thus, the trustee and the
debtor cannot be equated, and the trustee cannot be an agent of the
debtor for purposes of reviving the trust in the hands of the trustee. 54
Consequently, the court found that the trustee could not have suc
ceeded to First Capital's interest as escrow agent in the funds. Second,
the court noted that the language of section 550 clearly states that
avoided transfers are recovered for the benefit of the estate. 55 Thus,
the court held that section 550 requires the inclusion of the funds in
the estate.
After concluding that the recovered escrow funds were property
of the bankruptcy estate, the court proceeded to consider whether a
constructive trust should be imposed on the funds in favor of Re
search-Planning. 56 The court held that a constructive trust should not
be imposed on the funds. The court reasoned that if it were not for
First Capital's bankruptcy and the assertion of the trustee's avoidance
powers, First Security would have been able to retain the funds as a
bona fide purchaser.57 Therefore, it would be inequitable to give Re
search-Planning priority over First Capital's other unsecured creditors
because this would place Research-Planning in a better position than it
was in prior to the bankruptcy. 58 Consequently, the court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's dismissal of Research-Planning's complaint. Re
search-Planning appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit.

505,511 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) and Staats v. Barry (In re Barry), 31 B.R. 683 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1983».
52. See supra note 13 for the text of § 541(a).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1988).
54. First Capital, 99 B.R. at 467; see also Merrill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clear
ing House Co.), 41 B.R. 985, 999 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984), a./J'd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nom. Merrill v. Dietz (In re Universal Clearing House Co.), 62 B.R. 118
(Bankr. D. Utah 1986).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988).
56. First Capital, 99 B.R. at 467. See supra note 38 for the elements required to
impose a constructive trust.
57. Id. at 468.
58. Id.
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United States Court ofAppeals for the Tenth Circuit
Panel Decision S9
1.

Majority60

On appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court decision 61 and held that the funds should be
returned to Research-Planning. 62 The court focused on the language
of section 547(b), which grants the trustee the power to avoid transfers
of property in which the debtor had an interest. 63 The court reasoned
that since First Capital had no title to the escrow funds in its posses
sion, those funds could not be recovered for the bankruptcy estate
under section 547. 64 The fact that the trustee asserted his avoidance
powers and First Security relented by settling did not, in itself, change
the ownership of the funds. 6s In reality, the trustee came into posses
sion of the funds by a mere fortuity.
Additionally, the court determined that First Security's tempo
rary status as a bona fide purchaser did not divest Research-Planning
of the ownership of the funds. 66 The court reasoned that First Secur
ity was shielded from a claim for the funds during the time it held
them due to its status as a bona fide purchaser. As soon as the funds
came into the possession of the bankruptcy trustee, however, First Se
curity's bona fide purchaser status became irrelevant with respect to
the relationship between the trustee and Research-Planning. On this
basis, the court reversed the bankruptcy and district court decisions
and held in favor of Research-Planning. 67
2.

Dissent68

Judge Seymour, in a dissenting opinion, relied on the tracing ar
59. Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 872
F.2d 335 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (2-1 decision with Judge Seth joined by a district
court judge comprising the majority).
60. Id.
61. For a discussion of the district court decision see supra notes 44-58 and accom
panying text.
62. First Capital, 872 F.2d at 335.
63. See supra note 14 for the text of 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
64. First Capital, 872 F.2d at 336 (relying on the district court's determination that
First Capital, as escrow agent, had no title to, and therefore no interest in, the escrow
funds).
65. Id. at 336-37.
66. Id. at 337.
67. Id.
68. One member of the three-judge panel, Judge Seymour, dissented in a separate
opinion. Id.
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gument made previously by the bankruptcy court. 69 Judge Seymour
urged that since the funds were transferred to a bona fide purchaser,
Research-Planning's only recourse became a general claim for dam
ages against First Capital. 70 When the bankruptcy petition was filed,
Research-Planning remained a general unsecured creditor of First
Capital, and the recovery of the funds by the trustee did not change
this status. Thus, Judge Seymour asserted that Research-Planning
should take its place in line with all other general unsecured creditors
of First Capital,71 The trustee in bankruptcy appealed the panel
decision.
E.

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit-En Bane 72
1.

Majority73

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel
decision 74 and affirmed the district court's decision7s that the funds
were property of First Capital's bankruptcy estate,16 The court relied
on "the unambiguous language of the Code" in sections 541(a)77 and
55078 for the conclusion that avoided transfers, by definition, are re
covered for the benefit of the estate and become property of the es
tate. 79 In order to apply this conclusion to the facts of the case, the
court made the assumption that "property recovered in a court-ap
proved settlement of a preference action is treated similarly to prop
erty recovered after judgment on the same action."80
69. First Capital, 872 F.2d at 337 (Seymour, J., dissenting). See supra note 40 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this argument.
70. Judge Seymour relied on 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 541.13 at 541-76 to 541
77 (L. King ed., 15th ed. 1988) which states that the beneficiary of a trust must be able to
trace its funds into some assets held by the debtor at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed
in order to recover them.
In this case, the funds were not in First Capital's possession at the time of bankruptcy
nor were any assets to which the funds could be traced. First Capital, 872 F.2d at 337-38.
71. First Capital, 872 F.2d at 338.
72. Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 917
F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1990).
73. Judge Seymour authored the majority opinion in which Chief Judge Holloway,
and Circuit Judges McKay, Logan, Moore, Anderson, Tacha, Baldock, Brorby, and Ebel
joined.
74. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
76. First Capital, 917 F.2d at 429.
77. See supra note 13 for the text of § 541(a).
78. See supra note 15 for the text of § 550(a).
79. First Capital, 917 F.2d at 427.
80. Id. This assumption is necessary to the court's analysis because the court relied
on the language of §§ 541(a) and 550 for the premise that all recovered preferences auto
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In a separate equity argument, the court bolstered its decision by
citing the "prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among
creditors of the debtor."81 The court reasoned that if First Capital
had not been involuntarily placed in bankruptcy, and if the trustee had
not asserted his avoidance powers, neither Research-Planning nor
First Capital would have had any claim for the funds against the bona
fide purchaser, First Security. Therefore, to allow Research-Planning
to be made whole by the exercise of the trustee's avoidance powers
would frustrate Congress' purpose in granting the power, namely,
equality of distribution among creditors. 82
2.

Dissent 83

Judge Seth's key point of dissension was with the majority's as
sumption that the settlement of a preference action has the same effect
as a judgment allowing the avoidance of the preference. 84 Judge Seth
argued that since the funds were not the debtor's property, the trustee,
under section 547, had no power to recover them as a preference. In
the absence of any statutory power, mere possession by the trustee
does not make the funds part of the bankruptcy estate. 8S Judge Seth
asserted that, "the bare fact that suit was filed and that the funds were
paid cannot be enough in these circumstances to launder the trust out
of the funds in the hands of the Trustee in Bankruptcy."86
Additionally, Judge Seth, citing section 541(d),87 argued that to
allow the trustee to recover trust funds to the exclusion of the benefici
ary's interest would be contrary to the intent of Congress in granting
the avoidance power. 88 He noted that section 541(d) indicates that the
trustee only receives the property interest that the debtor had and
matica1ly become part of the bankruptcy estate regardless of any prior property interest
held in them by third parties. Id. See supra notes 13 and 15 respectively for the text of
§§ 541(a) and 550(a).
81. Id. at 428 (quoting H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1977), re
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138).
82. Id.
83. Judge Seth was the sole dissenter.
84. First Capital, 917 F.2d at 429 (Seth, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 430.
86. Id.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1988), in relevant part, states as follows:
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case,
only legal title and not an equitable interest . . . becomes property of the estate
under subsection (a)(I) ... of this section only to the extent ofthe debtor's legal
title to such property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in such prop
erty that the debtor does not hold.
Id.
88. First Capital, 917 F.2d at 431.
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nothing more. 89 Under this reading of the language, the trustee in this
case received no title to the escrow funds since the debtor, as escrow
agent, had no title to the funds. 90

III.

ANALYSIS

The majority's analysis in First Capital creates an anomaly in
bankruptcy law that should not exist. Simply stated, the Court of Ap
peals for the Tenth Circuit allowed the bankruptcy trustee to appro
priate escrow funds that he would not have had any claim to had the
debtor been in possession of those funds at the commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding. The determinative factor in the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision was that the funds were temporarily in the
possession of a third party bona fide purchaser. 91 As the district court
conceded, "Admittedly, this result is not wholly satisfactory."92 That
court continued, "By its actions, First Capital has precluded the court
from doing complete justice among all the parties."93 However, a
more complete consideration of the relevant facts and statutory lan
guage results in a conclusion favoring the interest of Research-Plan
ning in its escrow funds and maintaining the consistency of
bankruptcy law.
A.

The Statutory Language and Legislative History of the
Bankruptcy Code Do Not Manifest an Intent to Include
Escrow Funds in the Bankruptcy Estate

Section 541, which defines property of the estate, specifically lim
its the interest acquired by the estate to the same interest held by the
debtor. 94 In First Capital, the debtor, as an escrow agent, technically
had neither a legal nor an equitable interest in the trust funds it held. 9s
Under section 541, it appears that Congress never intended the bank
ruptcy estate to include property in which the debtor does not hold
some kind of interest.
Section 547, which governs the avoidance of preferences, clearly
states that "the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 427.
92. Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 99
B.R. 462, 469 (D. Utah 1987).
93. Id.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1988). See supra note 87 for the text of this provision.
95. See supra note 45 and infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
90.
91.
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debtor in property."96 This language appears to limit the trustee's
avoidance power to those interests in property that are held by the
debtor. Certainly, Congress did not intend to confer upon the trustee
the authority to recover property interests that do not belong to the
debtor. It would have been irrational for Congress to define the bank
ruptcy estate to include only property in which the debtor has an in
terest and then to allow the trustee to augment the estate with other
property in which the debtor has no interest.
Moreover, section 550 provides that an avoided transfer may be
recovered "for the benefit of the estate. "97 In order for this language
to become operative with respect to section 547, a preference must be
avoided under section 547. 98 However, as discussed above, sections
547 and 541 strictly limit the trustee's power to avoid preferences to
situations where the debtor held an interest in the property that was
transferred. 99 Thus, it does not appear that section 550 authorizes the
recovery of property not belonging to the debtor.loo
In addition to the statutory language, Congress has revealed its
intent to limit the bankruptcy estate to property in which the debtor
has an interest. In the Senate Report discussing section 541, the sec
tion which defines property of the estate, the Senate stated that this
section "is not intended to expand the debtor's rights against others
more than they exist at the commencement of the case."101 It is evi
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
98. See supra note 15.
99. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Bankruptcy in the Seventh Circuit: 1989-1990, 24
IND. L. REV. 551,552-54 (1991) (arguing that a trustee's § 547 powers are limited by the
operation of § 541 and § 550 which permit only property of the debtor to be included in the
bankruptcy estate).
100. See John C. McCoid, II, Preservation ofAvoided Transfers and Liens, 77 VA. L.
REv. 1091, 1124-26 (1991) for the conclusion that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was
correct in allowing the trustee in the First Capital case to use the recovered escrow funds
for the benefit of all creditors. This conclusion is based on an assumption that II U.S.C.
§ 551 applied in that case. Section 551 provides that any transfer avoided under § 547,
among others, "is preserved for the benefit of the estate but only with respect to property of
the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1988). This analysis, however, fails to consider the implica
tion of the fact that, under Utah law, First Capital had no property interest in the escrow
funds in its possession. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text. Section 547 only
gives a trustee power to avoid transfers "of an interest of the debtor in property." 11
U.S.C. § 547 (1988). Since the escrow funds were not the property of First Capital, the
trustee had no power to recover them under § 547. Without a valid § 547 recovery, § 551
of the Bankruptcy Code is not implicated and cannot be applied to validate the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in First Capital. See Boshkoff, supra note 99, at 552-54.
101. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 22, at 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5868.
The report continues, "For example, if the debtor has a claim that is barred at the time of
the commencement of the case by the statute of limitations, then the trustee would not be
96.
97.
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dent, on this basis, that to allow the trustee to include escrow funds in
the estate would do violence to the congressional intent that the
debtor's rights not be expanded by section 541. Such an inclusion
would expand the debtor's rights in escrow funds, in which the debtor
previously had only a possessory interest, to the point of full
ownership.
Likewise, further comment on section 541(d) states that this sec
tion "reiterates the general principle that where the debtor holds bare
legal title without any equitable interest, . . . the estate acquires bare
legal title without any equitable interest in the property."102 This lan
guage seems to indicate that the bankruptcy estate's interest in prop
erty is limited by the debtor's interest.
Unlike the legislative history of section 541(d), the legislative his
tory of section 547 does not specifically indicate an intent to limit the
trustee's avoidance powers to property interests held by the debtor.
However, the language of the section itself clearly defines this bound
ary.103 Moreover, it would be illogical for Congress to limit the bank
ruptcy estate to property interests of the debtor 104 and then to sanction
the trustee's recovery, under section 547, of property in which the
debtor has no interest. Thus, it appears that both the plain language
of the Bankruptcy Code and the legislative history do not reveal any
intent to include in the estate property not belonging to the debtor.
B.

Case Law Does Not Support the Inclusion in the Estate of
Property in Which the Debtor Has No Interest

Case law is in accordance with the general proposition that the
bankruptcy estate cannot include any property in which the debtor
does not have an interest. lOS In Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance
able to pursue that claim, because he too would be barred. He could take no greater rights
than the debtor himself had." Id. See supra note 24.
102. 124 CONGo REc. 33,999 (1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
103. Section 547 specifically states, "the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest
o/the debtor in property." 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988) (emphasis added). See supra note 14
for the full text of § 547(b).
104. See supra notes 13 and 14 for the text of 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a) and 547(b) (1988),
which limit the bankruptcy estate to property interests of the debtor.
105. It should be noted that First Capital did have a possessory interest in the funds
it held in escrow. However, since the legislative history seems to indicate that the trustee
can only acquire the interest ofthe debtor, the most the trustee in this case could become is
a second escrow agent with respect to Research-Planning's funds. In the position of an
escrow agent, the trustee would be bound by the escrow agreement to deliver the funds to
the borrower if the transaction were completed or to Research-Planning if the transaction
were abandoned. See Geoffrey Orlandi, Note, Property 0/ the Estate: Section 541, 3
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Co. ,106 the United States Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a
fund, not in possession of the debtor, became property of the estate in
a bankruptcy proceeding. 107 The Court noted, with regard to the
debtor's interest in the fund, that "[p]roperty interests in a fund not
owned by a bankrupt at the time of adjudication, whether complete or
partial, legal or equitable ... are of course not a part of the bankrupt's
property and do not vest in the trustee."108 The Court continued,
"The Bankruptcy Act simply does not authorize a trustee to distribute
other people's property among a bankrupt's creditors."I09
Similarly, where the debtor has a limited interest in property, the
estate may only succeed to that interest and no more. In Cross Electric
Co. v. United States (In re Cross Electric Co.), 110 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, after quoting the House Re
port,lll made clear that section 541 "simply transfer[s] to the [trustee]
the debtor's interests in property as it [sic] existed at the time of the
commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings and if those interests
were limited at that time, the trustee's rights to possession are simi
larly limited."ll2 Additionally, in two cases dealing with the bank
ruptcy trustee's rights to escrow accounts opened pursuant to
mortgage agreements, the courts held that the accounts became prop
erty of the estate, subject to the same limitations that the mortgage
agreements placed on the debtor.ll3
BANKR. DEV. 1. 341, 353-56 (1986), for a discussion of whether a debtor's possessory inter
est is sufficient to render property part of the bankruptcy estate.
106. 371 U.S. 132 (1962).
107. Id. at 134. In Pearlman, the United States government was in possession of a
payment fund that had been withheld pending satisfactory completion of a construction
project by the debtor. The debtor failed to satisfy his contract, and subsequently entered
bankruptcy. Id. The government turned the fund over to the trustee in bankruptcy after a
surety company paid for the completion of the project by another contractor. Id. The
surety company then made a claim for the fund in the hands of the trustee, since by paying
for the completion of the project it had acquired the rights to the withheld payment fund.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the money belonged to the surety company because
property interests which do not belong to the debtor cannot become part of the bankruptcy
estate. Id. at 141-42.
108. Id. at 135.
109. Id. at 135-36.
110. 664 F.2d 1218 (4th Cir. 1981).
111. See supra note 17.
112. Cross, 664 F.2d at 1220.
113. Wilson v. United Savings (In re Missionary Baptist Found. of America), 792
F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1986); N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank (In re N.S.
Garrott & Sons), 772 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1985). See Susan C. Gieser, Note, Property 0/ the
Estate: Section 541(a)(l), 4 BANKR. DEV. 1. 123, 135-39 (1986) for a discussion of these
two cases. See also Vineyard v. McKenzie (In re Quality Holstein Leasing Inc.), 752 F.2d
1009, 1013 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating, in reference to § 54l(d), that "Congress did not mean
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Therefore, it seems that there is a firm judicial stance supporting
the proposition that a bankruptcy trustee can only receive an interest
in property equal to that held by the debtor. This concept, reasonably
extended, indicates that where the debtor holds no interest in prop
erty, the Bankruptcy Code does not grant the trustee any interest in
this property either.
C.

Property Rights Must Be Determined By State Law

The initial inquiry in determining which property becomes part of
the estate must be one of state law, since the Bankruptcy Code does
not provide rules for determining whether a debtor has an interest in
particular property. 114 Thus, to determine"a debtor's interest in prop
erty, the court must look to state law.1lS Once this determination is
made, the Bankruptcy Code defines the extent to which that interest is
property of the estate. 116
However, there do not appear to be any Utah decisions specifi
cally defining the interest of an escrow agent in escrowed property.
Yet, the Supreme Court of Utah has held that when a depositor exe
cutes an escrow agreement and deposits the subject matter into es
crow, the depositor retains title to the subject matter until all the
conditions of the escrow agreement have been satisfied, at which point
title passes to the depositor's grantee. 1l7 Utah courts also generally
to authorize a bankruptcy estate to benefit from property that the debtor did not own"
(footnote omitted»; Angeles Real Estate Co. v. Kerxton (In re Construction General, Inc.),
737 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1984) (refusing to include in the bankruptcy estate the proceeds of a
note previously assigned by the debtor to the plaintiff. The proceeds of the note had been
misappropriated by the debtor and recovered as a preference by the trustee). But see In re
Vermont Fiberglass, Inc., 44 B.R. 50S, 511 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) (stating that "the trustee
succeeds to such rights as he may defeat in the hands of the transferee of an avoided trans
fer"); Staats v. Barry (In re Barry), 31 B.R. 683, 686 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that
the bankruptcy trustee succeeds "to the rights of the transferee in the avoided transfer").
114. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (holding that property rights under
the Bankruptcy Code are defined by state law); Garrott, 772 F.2d at 466 (relying on 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 541.02[1] (L. King 15th ed. 1985) for the same proposition).
115. Garrott, 772 F.2d at 466.
116. Id.
117. Foxley v. Rich, 99 P. 666, 669 (Utah 1909). See also 30A C.J.S. Escrows § 11
(1992) ("Until the performance of the condition, or the happening of the event, on which
delivery is to be made by the depositary, the legal title to land to be conveyed by the
instrument, or to other matter placed in escrow, remains in the grantor or depositor ....").
Other jurisdictions follow this analytical pattern. See. e.g., Press v. Marvalan Industries,
Inc., 422 F. Supp. 346, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[T]he incidents of ownership remain in the
person depositing the property into escrow until the conditions of the escrow agreement are
fulfilled."); Pagan v. Spencer, 232 P.2d 323, 326 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) ("The title to
money deposited in escrow to be paid to the vendor of property does not pass until all the
conditions of the escrow have been fulfilled."); Beren Corp. v. Spader, 255 N.W.2d 247,254
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hold that an escrow agent is the mere agent of the parties to the trans
action. lls By implication, then, the escrow agent appears never to ac
tually hold title to the escrowed property. Title remains in the escrow
depositor until it passes directly to the grantee under the escrow
transaction.
Therefore, First Capital, as escrow agent, arguably had no inter
est in the funds deposited with it other than to see that they were
transferred to their rightful owner upon completion of the escrow con
dition. Under Utah law,ll9 First Capital was merely the agent of the
contracting parties and was nothing more than a conduit through
which the escrowed funds passed from one party to the other. Under
section 547, the trustee in bankruptcy is only empowered to avoid
transfers "of an interest of the debtor in property."120 Thus, since the
escrow funds were not the property of First Capital, the trustee did
not have the power to recover them under section 547.
Nor does it seem reasonable to assume that the requirement of
section 547, that the debtor have an interest in the property recovered,
was satisfied simply because the trustee came into possession of the
escrow funds pursuant to the settlement of a preference action. It
should be noted that there was never any judicial determination that
section 547 applied to this case. l2l First Security, the bank to which
the funds were improperly paid by First Capital, voluntarily surren
dered the funds to the trustee in the absence of any judicial mandate to
that effect.122 This circumstance does not change the fact that First
Capital was merely an escrow agent in possession of funds belonging
to another party.
Assuming that the Bankruptcy Code did not authorize the trustee
to recover the escrowed funds, a determination must now be made as
to who is entitled to the funds. 123 As would be expected, the true
(Neb. 1977) (stating that in land sale contract where deed is placed in escrow, seller retains
legal title while buyer receives equitable title); Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, Inc., 424
N.W.2d 649,661 (S.D. 1988) (holding that escrow depositor retains legal and equitable title
to deposited funds until escrow conditions are met).
118. Freegard v. First Western Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987); Morris v.
Clark, 112 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1941), cen. denied, 314 U.S. 584 (1941); Nelson v. Ashton
Jenkins Co., 242 P. 408, 410 (Utah 1925); Gammon v. Bunnell, 64 P. 958, 959 (Utah 1900).
119. See supra notes 117-18.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
121. Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.),
917 F.2d 424, 429 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Seth, J., dissenting).
122. Id. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
123. See Nancy L. Sanborn, Note, Avoidance Recoveries in Bankruptcy: For the Ben
efit o/the Estate or the Secured Creditor?, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1376, 1384-86 (1990) (com
menting that "although bankruptcy courts have long held that avoidance recoveries are
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owner of stolen property can recover it from a thief. 124 If First Capital
had merely stolen Research-Planning's funds, Research-Planning
could have recovered them from First Capital. 125 Here, however, as a
result of First Capital's misappropriation of the escrow money, the
funds were placed in the hands of a third party, the trustee, who is not
a representative of First Capital. 126 Therefore, the rule allowing re
covery from a thief does not apply since the funds are not in the hands
of the thief, First Capital.
In general, the true owner of property may recover it from a
transferee of a thief as long as the transferee is not a bona fide pur
chaser. 127 In this case, however, First Security, the party to which the
escrow funds were improperly transferred, was a bona fide pur
chaser.128 The trustee, now in possession, however, received the funds
from First Security with knowledge of the misappropriation by First
Capital. 129 It seems that to allow a transferee with knowledge, who
gave no value, to gain full title to stolen property simply because the
property was washed by passing it through a bona fide purchaser, does
violence to the owner's state law rights in the property that has been
stolen from him. 130
Since the escrow funds are not property of the debtor, the bank
ruptcy trustee is not empowered to use them to benefit the estate. A
available for all creditors of the estate, the recognition of a creditor's entitlement to recov
ered property pursuant to non bankruptcy law is not precluded by the language of the
[Bankruptcy] Code, its legislative history or Supreme Court interpretations of the bank
ruptcy statutes.").
124. See Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Jolley, 467 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah 1970) (holding that "[w]here one has stolen or
embezzled the money or property of another, he obtains no title whatsoever").
125. Id.
126. See Merrill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing House Co.), 41 B.R. 985, 999
(Bankr. D. Utah 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Merrill v.
Dietz (In re Universal Clearing House Co.), 62 B.R. 118 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986) (stating·
that the trustee acts "in a representative capacity on behalf of all the creditors" and there
fore cannot be the representative of the debtor); c/. 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1988) (stating that
"[t]he trustee ... is the representative of the estate").
127. Jolley, 467 P.2d at 985.
128. Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.),
917 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
129. The trustee must have had knowledge of the misappropriation, since he traced
the funds to First Security and was aware of their source. Id. at 429 (Seth, J., dissenting).
See Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 872 F.2d
335, 336 (10th Cir. 1989) (panel decision) (stating that "[t]he trustee had been able to
demonstrate that the money came from the debtor originally, and there seems to be no
question as to this source of the funds. The funds were held by the debtor who had control
of them only pursuant to the escrow agreement with Research-Planning").
130. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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key motivation in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision that
the funds should become property of the estate was the fundamental
bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors. 131
However, where, as here, the Bankruptcy Code is not implicated,132
this motivation is not valid. Therefore, the court should have placed
title to the escrow funds in the hands of their owner, Research
Planning.
CONCLUSION

Courts deciding cases similar to First Capital must be careful not
to send the wrong message to bankruptcy trustees. The Bankruptcy
Code and its legislative history indicate that Congress only intended
the bankruptcy estate to include the debtor's property. A decision
such as First Capital, on the other hand, may encourage trustees to
pursue questionable claims under the Bankruptcy Code in the hopes of
augmenting the bankruptcy estate. Furthermore, allowing the bank
ruptcy trustee's treatment of an escrow depositor's funds to depend on
the prepetition conduct of the debtor complicates bankruptcy proceed
ings with needless litigation and violates basic principles of property
law. Congress clearly did not intend to espouse this sort of anomalous
treatment when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code.
Dean A. Dulchinos

131. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
132. The Bankruptcy Code is not implicated here because the trustee was not em
powered by § 547 to include the misappropriated escrow funds in the estate since the
debtor had no interest in the funds.

